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Wiretap Channels with
Causal State Information: Strong Secrecy
Te Sun Han, Life Fellow, IEEE, Masahide Sasaki
Abstract
The coding problem for wiretap channels with causal channel state information available at the encoder and/or
the decoder is studied under the strong secrecy criterion. This problem consists of two aspects: one is due to wiretap
channel coding and the other is due to one-time pad cipher based on the secret key agreement between Alice and Bob
using the channel state information. These two aspects are closely related to each other and give rise to an intriguing
tradeoff between exploiting the state to boost secret-message rates versus extracting cryptographic key to improve
secrecy capabilities. This issue has yet to be understood how to optimally reconcile the two. We newly devised the
iterative forward-backward coding scheme, combining wiretap channel coding and secret-key-agreement-based one-
time pad cipher. We then established reasonable lower bounds of the secrecy capacity for wiretap channels with causal
channel state information available only at the encoder (Theorem 1), which can be easily extended to general cases
with various kinds of correlated channel state information at the encoder (Alice), decoder (Bob) and wiretapper (Eve).
In particular, for degraded wiretap channels, we give the secret-message (secret-key) capacity bounds (Theorems 2,
4).
Index Terms
wiretap channel, channel state information, causal coding, secret key agreement, secrecy capacity, strong secrecy
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper the coding problem for the wiretap channel (WC) with causal channel state information (CSI)
available at the encoder (Alice) and/or the decoder (Bob) is studied. The concept of WC (without CSI) originates in
Wyner [1] and was extended to a more general WC by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2]. These landmark papers have been
followed by many subsequent extensions and generalizations from the viewpoint of theory and practice. In particular,
among others, the WC with CSI has also been extensively investigated in the literature. Early works include Mitrpant,
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2Vinck and Luo [6], Chen and Vinck [7], and Liu and Chen [8] that have studied the capacity-equivocation region
for degraded WCs with non-causal CSI to establish inner and/or outer bounds on the region, which was motivated
by physical-layer security problems to actually intervene in practical fading channel communications. Moreover,
subsequent recent developments in this direction with non-causal CSI can be found also in Dai, Zhuang and Vinck
[10], Boche and Schaefer [11], Dai and Luo [18], Prabhakaran et al. [24], Goldfeld et al. [25], Bunin et al. [26],
etc.
Generally speaking, the coding scheme with causal/non-causal CSI outperforms the one without CSI, because
knowledge of the CSI enables us to share a common secret key between Alice and Bob to augment the secrecy
capacity. More specifically, then, in addition to the standard WC coding (called the Wyner’s WC coding [1], [2])
without resorting to the CSI, we may incorporate also the cryptographic scheme called the Shannon’s one-time pad
(OTP) cipher (cf. Shannon [4]) based on the secret key agreement (cf. Maurer [12], Ahlswede and Csisza´r [13])
using the CSI between Alice and Bob. Thus, the problem consists of two aspects: one is due to wiretap channel
coding and the other is due to one-time pad cipher based on the secret key agreement. Here is the trade-off between
them depending on how to use the state information S.
Recent works taking account of such a secrecy key agreement aspect include Khisti, Diggavi and Wornell [14],
Chia and El Gamal [17], Sonee and Hodtani [19], and Fujita [20]. In particular, [14] addresses the problem of
key capacity that focuses on the maximum rate of secret key agreement between Alice and Bob rather than on
the maximum rate of secure message transmission. However, we cannot say that the secrecy capacity problem in
these works with causal CSI has now been fully solved. This is because the problem with causal/non-causal CSI
necessarily includes the two separate but closely related coding schemes as mentioned in the above paragraph.
Among others, Chia and El Gamal [17] addresses the case with causal common CSI available at both Alice and
Bob, whereas Fujita [20] deals with the case with causal CSI available only at Alice (given a physically degraded
WC). Both includes lower bounds on the weak secrecy capacity, but with tight secrecy capacity formulas in special
cases. The present paper is motivated mainly by these two papers, and the main result to be given in this paper
is in nice accordance with their results. In particular, we have newly established the iterative forward-backward
coding scheme for WCs with causal CSI available at Alice with reasonable lower bounds on secrecy capacity. For
degraded channels, we successfully established not only lower/upper bounds, but also several exact secret-massage
(secret-key) capacities.
The present paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we give the statement of the problem and the key result (Theorem 1) for the WC with causal CSI
available only at Alice along with comparison with the work of Chia and El Gamal [17].
In Section III, we give the detailed proof of Theorem 1 to establish lower bounds on the strong secrecy capacity.
The main ingredients for the proof are Slepian-Wolf coding, Csisza´r-Ko¨rner’s key construction, Gallager’s maximum
likelihood decoding, and Han-Verdu´’s resolvability argument, where in the process of these proofs we do not invoke
the argument of typical sequences at all, which enables us to cope with alphabets that are not necessarily finite
(e.g., for Gaussian WCs).
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3In Section IV, in order to obtain insights into the significance of Theorem 1, we provide specific secrecy capacity
bounds (including upper/lower bounds) for degraded WCs with causal/non-causal CSI (Theorems 2, 4, 5 and
Corollaries 1, 2, 3).
In Section V, since the present work has partly close bearing with that of Fujita [20], we compare both of them
to scrutinize the details of these works.
In Section VI, we conclude the paper with several remarks.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND THE RESULT
A stationary memoryless WC as illustrated in Fig. 1 is specified by giving the conditional (transition) probability
p(y, z|x, s) = PY Z|XS(y, z|x, s) (1)
with input random variable X (for Alice), outputs random variables Y (for Bob), Z (for Eve), and CSI random
variable S, which are assumed to take values in alphabets X ,Y,Z,S, respectively. Alice X (sender), who only has
access to stationary memoryless CSI S available, wants to send a confidential message M ∈M = [1 : 2nR] (over
n channel transmissions) to Bob Y (legitimate receiver) while keeping it secret from Eve Z (eavesdropper), where
we use here and hereafter the notation [i : j] = {i, i+ 1, · · · , j − 1, j} for j ≥ i, and R ≥ 0 is called the rate.
Fig. 1. WC with CSI available only at Alice (i = 1, 2, · · · , n).
An (n, 2nR) code for the WC with causal CSI S at the encoder consists of
(i) a message set M = [1 : 2nR],
(ii) a stochastic “causal” encoder fi :M×S
i → X subject to conditional probability p(x|m, si)
to produce the channel input Xi(M) = fi(M,S
i) at each time i ∈ [1 : n], and
(iii) a decoder g : Yn →M (for Bob) to assign an estimate Mˆ to each received sequence Y, where we use the
notation ai = a1a2 · · · ai (in particular, a = a1a2 · · · an: the bold-faced letters indicate sequences of length n) and
assume that the message M is uniformly distributed on the message set M.
The probability of error is defined to be Pe = Pr{Mˆ 6=M}. The information leakage at Eve with output sequence
Z, which measures the amount of information about M that leaks out to Eve, is defined to be IE = I(M ;Z) (the
mutual information between M and Z). It should be noted here that this measure is not RE =
1
n
I(M ;Z) (the
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4information leakage rate). This means that in this paper we are concerned only with the strong secrecy but not the
weak secrecy as was the case in the literature (e.g., cf. Chia and El Gamal [17], Fujita [20]).
A secrecy rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of codes (n, 2nR) with Pe → 0 and IE → 0
as n→∞. The secrecy capacity with CSI available only at the encoder (=E), denoted by CCSI-E, is the supremum
of all achievable rates.
In order to implement the coding scheme for the WC, it is convenient to introduce its associated channel ω as
follows: Let U be an arbitrary auxiliary random variable with values in a set U that is independent of the CSI
variable S, and let h : U ×S → X be a stochastic mapping subject to conditional probability p(x|u, s). According
to the Shannon strategy [5], we define the ω as the WC specified by the conditional probability
p(y, z|u, s) =
∑
x∈X
p(y, z|x, s)p(x|u, s), (2)
which gives the associated WC (called a test channel) with input variable U (Alice), outputs variables Y, Z (Bob
and Eve) and CSI variable S. Thus, hereafter we may focus solely on the coding problem for the channel ω from
the standpoint of achievabie rates.
Let us now describe the main result. Set
RCSI-0(p(u), p(x|u, s)) = I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z), (3)
RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) = min
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;SZ)
+H(S|Z)−H(S|UY ),
I(U ;Y )−H(S|UY )
]
, (4)
RCSI-2(p(u), p(x|u, s)) = min
[
H(S|UZ)−H(S|UY ), I(U ;Y )−H(S|UY )
]
, (5)
where I(·; ·), I(·; ·|·) denote the (conditional) mutual informations; and H(·), H(·|·) denote the (conditional) en-
tropies. Moreover, for simplicity we use the notation A1A2 · · ·Am to denote (A1, A2, · · · , Am).
Then, we have the following lower bound on the secrecy capacity CCSI-E with the understanding that RCSI-1(p(u),
p(x|u, s)) = 0 when I(U ;Y )− I(U ;SZ) < 0 or H(S|Z)−H(S|UY ) < 0:
Theorem 1: Let us consider the WC with CSI as in Fig.1 with causal CSI available only at Alice. Then, the
secrecy capacity CCSI-E is lower bounded as
CCSI-E ≥ max
[
max
p(u),p(x|u,s)
RCSI-0(p(u), p(x|u, s)),
max
p(u),p(x|u,s)
RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)),
max
p(u),p(x|u,s)
RCSI-2(p(u), p(x|u, s))
]
, (6)
where p(u), p(x|u, s) ranges over all possible (conditional) probability distributions such that p(u, s) = p(u)p(s),
and notice here that p(s) is a given distribution and so cannot be varied.
The term H(S|UY ) in (4), (5) specifies the rate of (auxiliary) Slepian-Wolf coding for information reconcillation
in secret key agreement (for OPT cipher) between Alice and Bob using the CSI; in (4) the term I(U ;Y )−I(U ;SZ)
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5specifies the transmission rate of confidential message via WC coding †; the termH(S|Z)−H(S|UY ) in (4) specifies
the key rate to transmit an additional confidential message via OTP cipher with the secret key shared between Alice
and Bob using the CSI; the term I(U ;Y ) −H(S|UY ) in (4), (5) specifies the upper bound on total transmission
rates for two kinds of confidential messages as above, excluding the Slepian-Wolf auxiliary message.
The achievability of RCSI-0(p(u), p(x|u, s)) is well known, which is attained by the standard WC coding without
resorting to the OTP cipher using the secret key generated by CSI (cf. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2], El Gamal and Kim
[29], Dai and Luo [18]). This is actually attained by employing the “one-time” CSI coding in the sense of Han,
Endo and Sasaki [22].
The achievability proof for RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) and RCSI-2(p(u), p(x|u, s)) in Theorem 1 is provided in the
next section.
Remark 1: Chia and El Gamal [17] have considered the WC with common CSI available at both Alice and Bob
as illustrated in Fig. 2. This channel, however, equivalently reduces to that in Fig. 1 with output YS ≡ SY instead
of Y . Then, since H(S|UYS) = H(S|USY ) = 0, RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) and RCSI-2(p(u), p(x|u, s)) in (4), (5)
reduce to
RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) = min
[
I(U ;SY )− I(U ;SZ) +H(S|Z), I(U ;SY )
]
, (7)
RCSI-2(p(u), p(x|u, s)) = min
[
H(S|UZ), I(U ;SY )
]
, (8)
where the right-hand side of (7) exactly coincides with the weak secrecy lower bound
min
[
I(U ;SY )− I(U ;SZ) +H(S|Z), I(U ;SY )
]
(9)
that was given by Chia and El Gamal [17], while the right-hand side of (8) coincides with one more weak secrecy
lower bound
min
[
H(S|UZ), I(U ;SY )
]
(10)
that was also given by [17]. Thus, Theorem 1 specialized to the case with “common” CSI available at both Alice
and Bob provides the strong secrecy version of their results. Specifically, this concludes that Theorems 1, 2 and 3
in [17] all hold with the strong secrecy criterion.
Remark 2: A basic feature of this paper is that we do not invoke the argument of typical sequences at all, so
we do not need the finiteness of alphabets U ,X ,Y,Z , while the alphabet S of CSI S needs to be finite.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The whole coding scheme involves the transmission of b independent messages over the b + 1 channel blocks
each of length n (b is a sufficiently large fixed positive integer), which are indexed by j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , b. The
formal proof is provided in the sequel, where in block j we let Uj ,Sj ,Xj ,Yj ,Zj (correlated i.i.d. sequences of
† Notice here that the WC ω in this paper is equipped with no public authenticated noiseless channel between Alice and Bob unlike in the
standard setting of secret key agreement, but all communications occur inside the WC ω in one-way fashion from Alice to Bob.
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6Fig. 2. WC with the same CSI available at Alice and Bob (i = 1, 2, · · · , n).
length n subject to joint probability PUSXY Z ) denote the random variables to indicate channel input sequence,
CSI sequence, channel input sequence for Alice, channel output sequences for Bob and Eve, respectively, whereas
Mj ,M0j,M1j , Nj denote the random variables to indicate uniformly distributed confidential messages to be sent,
and auxiliary message, respectively. Their realizations are indicated by the corresponding lower case letters.
Case A): Proof for the achievability of RCSI-1:
In what to follow, many kinds of (nonnegative) rates intervene with inequality constraints, which are listed as
follows:
R < I(U ;Y ), (11)
R = R0 +R1, (12)
R−R0 > I(U ;SZ), (13)
R2 > H(S|UY ), (14)
R0 +R1 +R2 < R, (15)
R1 +R2 < H(S|Z). (16)
Fourier-Motzkin elimination (cf. El Gamal and Kim [29]) claims that the supremum of R over all rates satisfying
(11)∼ (16) coincides with the right-hand side of (4), so it suffices to show that rates R satisfying (11)∼ (16) are
indeed achievable, where R is used to indicate an achievable rate for usual channel coding (non-WC) between Alice
and Bob.
Codebook generation:
For each block j ∈ [1 : b], split messageMj ∈ [1 : 2
nR] into two independent uniform messagesM0j ∈ [1 : 2
nR0 ]
and M1j ∈ [1 : 2
nR1 ]; thus R = R0+R1, where, in the process of channel transmission, message M0j is protected
by WC coding, and message M1j is protected by OTP cipher with the secret key shared using CSI. The codebook
generation consists of the following two parts:
1) Message codebook generation:
July 30, 2019 DRAFT
7Fig. 3. Bin-partitioning for message codebook generation in each channel block j.
For each block j ∈ [0 : b], randomly and independently generate sequences uj(l), l ∈ [1 : 2
nR], each according
to probability distribution
∏n
i=1 pU (ui) (uj(l) = u1u2 · · ·un). This is a random code and is denoted by Hj . On
the other hand, partition the set [1 : 2nR] of indices into 2nR0 equal-size bins B(m0),m0 ∈ [1 : 2
nR0 ]. Moreover,
partition the indices within each bin B(m0) into 2
nR1 equal-size sub-bins B(m0,m1),m1 ∈ [1 : 2
nR1 ]. Furthermore,
partition the indices within each bin B(m0,m1) into 2
nR2 equal-size sub-sub-bins B(m0,m1,m2),m2 ∈ [1 : 2
nR2 ]
(cf. Fig. 3). These bins are all non-empty because of (15).
2) Key codebook generation:
In order to construct an efficient key Kj = κ(Sj) of rate R1 using the CSI Sj , we invoke the following two
celebrated lemmas:
Lemma 1 (Slepian and Wolf [3]): Let ε > 0 be an arbitrarily small number and let R2 > H(S|UY ) (cf. (14)).
Then, there exists (deterministic) functions σ : Sn → [1 : 2nR2 ] and φ : [1 : 2nR2 ]× Un × Yn → Sn such that
Pr{Sj 6= S˜j} ≤ ε (17)
for all sufficiently large n, where S˜j = φ(σ(Sj),Uj ,Yj).
For simplicity, we use also the notation Nj+1 ≡ σ(Sj), which is the random variable conveying the auxiliary
message used for generating the common secret key between Alice and Bob.
Lemma 2 (Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [27, Corollary 17.5]): Let ε > 0 be an arbitrarily small number and let R1+R2 <
H(S|Z) (cf. (16)). Then, with the same Nj+1 ≡ σ(Sj) as in Lemma 1, there exists a (deterministic) key function
κ : Sn → [1 : 2nR1 ] such that
S (κ(Sj)σ(Sj)|Zj) ≤ ε (18)
July 30, 2019 DRAFT
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WC coding
CSI
Fig. 4. Sequence diagram of block Markov coding (Cj = Kj−1 ⊕M1j ; j = 1, 2, · · · , b).
for all sufficiently large n, where we use the notation (called the security index): ∗
S(K|F )
∆
= D(PKF ||QK × PF ) (19)
with the uniform distribution QK on the range of K , the KL divergence D(·||·) and the product distribution
QK × PF .
We use the thus defined deterministic function Kj−1 ≡ κ(Sj−1) as the key to be used in the next block j.
Encoding scheme
We use the block coding scheme as in Fig. 4, which is based on the block Markov coding scheme invented
by Cover and El Gamal [16] (cf. Fig. 4) and applied to the WC with CSI by Chia and El Gamal [17]. The first
block j = 0 provides only the CSI sequence S0 for Alice to be used for encoding in the second block j = 1
with M0 = N0 = “1” (fixed dummy message). In each block j ∈ [1 : b], given a message triple (M0j =
m0,M1j = m1, Nj = m2), Alice first computes cj = kj−1 ⊕m1 (mod 2
nR1) and let L
∆
= L(m0, cj,m2) be the
random index uniformly distributed on the bin B(m0, cj ,m2) with kj−1 = κ(sj−1) as specified in Lemma 2. Alice
then sends out for channel transmission a randomly generated sequence Xj according to conditional probability∏n
i=1 pX|US(xi|ui(L), si), where xj = x1x2 · · ·xn, uj(L) = u1(L)u2(L) · · ·un(L), sj = s1s2 · · · sn. We set
Uj = uj(L).
Decoding scheme and evaluation of probability of error:
Let Yj be the output for Bob due to Uj . Consider the stationary memoryless channel ωn(y|u) ≡ PYj |Uj (y|u)
with input u and output y. For this channel we use the maximum likelihood decoding, that is, we let lˆ denote an
∗ Specifically, in the proof of this lemma, it suffices to make uniform random hashing (κ, σ) : Sn → [1 : 2nR1 ]× [1 : 2nR2 ] (and hence
uniform random binnning σ : Sn → [1 : 2nR2 ] simultaneously) to construct a pair of deterministic mappings κ(Sj)σ(Sj ) ≡ (κ(Sj), σ(Sj ))
satisfying (17) and (18). This is possible owing to rate constraints R2 > H(S|UY ) and R1 +R2 < H(S|Z).
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9index such that
ωn(y|uj(lˆ)) = max
l∈[1:2nR]
ωn(y|uj(l)), (20)
and set Uˆj = uj(lˆ). Find the (mˆ0, cˆ, mˆ2) such that lˆ ∈ B(mˆ0, cˆ, mˆ2). Next, compute mˆ1 = cˆ⊖ kˆj−1 (mod 2
nR1 ),
where kˆj−1 = κ(sˆj−1) with sˆj−1 = φ(mˆ2,uj−1(lˆ),yj−1) and we notice that sˆj−1 = s˜j−1 if mˆ2 = m2 and
uj−1(lˆ) = uj−1(L) (cf. Lemmas 1 and 2). Finally, declare that the message pair (mˆ0, mˆ1) was sent. In order to
evaluate the probability of decoding error
Pe(j) ≡ Pr{(M0j ,M1j) 6= (Mˆ0j , Mˆ1j)|H}, (21)
we invoke
Lemma 3 (Gallager [28, Theorem 5.6.2]): Let ε > 0 be an arbitrarily small number and let R < I(U ;Y ) (cf.
(11)). Then,
Pr{(M0j , Cj , Nj ≡M2j ,Uj) 6= (Mˆ0j , Cˆj , Nˆj ≡ Mˆ2j , Uˆj)|H} ≤ ε (22)
for all sufficiently large n.
Then, in view of Lemmas 1 and 3, we have
Pe(j) ≤ Pr{(M0j , Cj , Nj,Uj) 6= (Mˆ0j , Cˆj , Nˆj, Uˆj)|H}
+Pr{Sj 6= S˜j}
≤ 2ε. (23)
Thus, it is concluded that the total probability of decoding error over all the b blocks is less than or equal to 2bε.
It should be remarked here that the total transmission rate averaged over all b+ 1 blocks is bR
b+1 because only the
b blocks of them are effective for message transmission, which can be made as close to R as desired by letting b
large enough.
Evaluation of information leakage:
We use the following notation: for j ∈ [1 : b],
H = H1H2 · · ·Hb,
Mj = M0jM1j,
M j = M1M2 · · ·Mj ,
M [j] = MjMj+1 · · ·Mb,
Zj = Z1Z2 · · ·Zj ,
Z[j] = ZjZj+1 · · ·Zb,
where we notice that Zj is the channel output for Eve in block j.
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Remark 3: Since Kj−1 and M1j are independent and M1j is assumed to be uniformly distributed, the OTP
cipher claims that Kj−1 and Cj = Kj−1 ⊕M1j are independent and Cj is uniformly distributed (cf. Shannon
[4]). Notice here that Kj−1 is not necessarily uniformly distributed, and hence M1j and Cj are not necessarily
independent. On the other hand, Zj−1 may affect Zj only through Kj−1Nj and inversely Zj−1 may be affected
by Zj only through CjNj . This property plays the crucial role in evaluating the performance of our coding scheme
(cf. Fig.4).
In the sequel we show that the information leakage to Eve IE = I(M
b;Zb|H) over the whole b+1 blocks goes
to zero as n→∞.
To do so, we begin with
A
∆
= I(M b;Zb|H)
=
b∑
j=1
I(Mj ;Z
b|M [j+1]H)
(a)
≤
b∑
j=1
I(Mj ;Z
b|SjM
[j+1]H)
(b)
=
b∑
j=1
I(Mj ;Z
j |SjH)
=
b∑
j=1
I(M0jM1j ;Z
j |SjH)
=
b∑
j=1
I(M0jM1j ;Z
j−1|SjH)
+
b∑
j=1
I(M0jM1j ;Zj |Z
j−1SjH)
(c)
=
b∑
j=1
I(M0jM1j ;Zj |Z
j−1SjH)
= B + C (24)
with
B
∆
=
b∑
j=1
I(M0j;Zj |Z
j−1SjH) (25)
C
∆
=
b∑
j=1
I(M1j;Zj |M0jZ
j−1SjH), (26)
where (a) follows from the independence of Mj and Sj given M
[j+1]H; (b) follows from the Markov chain
propertyMj → Z
jSj → Z
[j+1]M [j+1] given H; (c) follows from the independence of M0jM1jSj and Z
j−1 given
H.
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Let us now separately evaluate B and C in (25) and (26). First,
B =
b∑
j=1
I(M0j ;Zj |Z
j−1SjH)
≤
b∑
j=1
I(Zj−1M0j ;Zj |SjH)
=
b∑
j=1
I(M0j ;Zj |SjH)
+
b∑
j=1
I(Zj−1;Zj |M0jSjH)
≤
b∑
j=1
I(M0j ;Zj |SjH)
+
b∑
j=1
I(Zj−1;NjM0jSjZj |H)
(d)
=
b∑
j=1
I(M0j ;SjZj |H)
+
b∑
j=1
I(Nj ;Z
j−1|H), (27)
where (d) follows from the independence of M0j and Sj and from the Markov chain property Z
j−1 → Nj →
M0jSjZj given H.
Next, C can be upper bounded as
C =
b∑
j=1
I(M1j ;Zj |M0jZ
j−1SjH)
≤
b∑
j=1
I(Zj−1M1j;Zj |M0jSjH)
= D + E, (28)
where
D
∆
=
b∑
j=1
I(M1j ;Zj |M0jSjH) (29)
E
∆
=
b∑
j=1
I(Zj−1;Zj |M0jM1jSjH). (30)
Then,
D ≤
b∑
j=1
I(M1j ;CjZj |M0jSjH)
= F +G, (31)
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where
F =
b∑
j=1
I(M1j ;Cj |M0jSjH),
G =
b∑
j=1
I(M1j ;Zj |M0jSjCjH). (32)
Then,
F =
b∑
j=1
I(M1j ;Cj |M0jSjH)
(f)
=
b∑
j=1
I(M1j ;Cj)
= H(Cj)−H(Cj |M1j)
(k)
= H(Cj)−H(Kj−1|M1j)
(g)
= H(Cj)−H(Kj−1)
(p)
= D(PKj−1 ||QKj−1), (33)
where (f) follows from the independence of M1jCj and M0jSjH; (k) follows from Kj−1 ⊕ M1j = Cj ; (g)
follows from the independence of Kj−1 and M1j ; (p) follows from that Cj is uniformly distributed on the range
of Kj−1.
Moreover,
G =
b∑
j=1
I(M1j ;Zj |M0jSjCjH)
(e)
=
b∑
j=1
I(Kj−1;Zj |M0jSjCjH)
(j)
≤
b∑
j=1
I(Kj−1;Nj |M0jSjCjH)
(m)
=
b∑
j=1
I(Kj−1;Nj), (34)
where (e) follows from Cj = Kj−1 ⊕M1j; (j) follows from the data processing lemma using the Markov chain
property Kj−1 → Nj → Zj given M0jSjCjH; (m) follows from the independence of Kj−1Nj and M0jSjCjH.
On the other hand,
E ≤
b∑
j=1
I(Zj−1;Kj−1NjZj |M0jM1jSjH)
(h)
=
b∑
j=1
I(Zj−1;Kj−1Nj|M0jM1jSjH)
(i)
=
b∑
j=1
I(Kj−1Nj ;Z
j−1|H), (35)
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where (h) follows from the Markov chain property Zj−1 → Kj−1Nj → Zj given M0jM1jSjH; (i) follows from
the independence of Zj−1Kj−1NjH and M0jM1jSj .
Thus, summarizing up (24)∼ (35), we have the upper bound on the information leakage to Eve IE = I(M
b;Zb|H)
as
Lemma 4 (Information leakage bound):
I(M b;Zb|H) ≤
b∑
j=1
I(M0j;SjZj |H) (36)
+
b∑
j=1
I(Nj ;Z
j−1|H). (37)
+
b∑
j=1
I(Kj−1;Nj) (38)
+
b∑
j=1
D(PKj−1 ||QKj−1) (39)
+
b∑
j=1
I(Kj−1Nj;Z
j−1|H). (40)
Here, the first term I(M0j;SjZj |H) specifies the resolvability performance for Eve; the second term I(Nj ;Z
j−1|H)
specifies the inter-block interaction effect in the block Markov coding scheme; the third and fourth terms I(Kj−1;Nj),
D(PKj−1 ||QKj−1) specify the key performance for Bob; and the fifth term I(Kj−1Nj ;Z
j−1|H) specifies the key
performance for Eve.
The third and fourth ones are evaluated as follows. We can rewrite the security index S(κ(Sj)σ(sSj)|Zj) in (18)
of Lemma 2 as
S(κ(Sj)σ(Sj)|Zj)
≥ D(Pκ(Sj)σ(Sj)||Qκ(Sj) ×Qσ(Sj))
= D(Pκ(Sj)σ(Sj)||Pκ(Sj) × Pσ(Sj))
+D(Pκ(Sj)||Qκ(Sj)) +D(Pσ(Sj)||Qσ(Sj))
≥ D(Pκ(Sj)σ(Sj)||Pκ(Sj) × Pσ(Sj))
= I(κ(Sj);σ(Sj))
= I(Kj;Nj+1). (41)
Moreover,
S(κ(Sj)σ(Sj)|Zj)
≥ S(κ(Sj)|Zj)
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= D(PKj ||QKj ) + I(Kj;Zj)
≥ D(PKj ||QKj ). (42)
Therefore, Lemma 2 claims that
I(Kj−1;Nj) ≤ ε, (43)
D(PKj−1 ||QKj−1) ≤ ε. (44)
In order to evaluate the second and fifth ones, we use the following lemma, which is the Alice-only CSI counterpart
of [17, Proposition 1]:
Lemma 5 (Key secrecy lemma): Let ε > 0 be an arbitrarily small number and let R1+R2 < H(S|Z) (cf. (16)).
Then, for j ∈ [1 : b],
i) I(Kj−1Nj ;Zj−1|H) ≤ ε, (45)
ii) I(Kj−1Nj ;Z
j−1|H) ≤ bε (46)
for all sufficiently large n.
Proof: See Appendix A.
From (46) we immediately have
I(Nj ;Z
j−1|H) ≤ I(Kj−1Nj;Z
j−1|H) ≤ bε. (47)
Now, what remains to be done is to evaluate the first one I(M0j ;SjZj |H). To do so, we invoke the following
resolvability lemma:
Lemma 6 (Resolvability lemma): Let ε > 0 be an arbitrarily small number and let R − R0 > I(U ;SZ) (cf.
(13)). Then,
I(M0j ;SjZj |H) ≤ ε (48)
for all sufficiently large n.
Proof: See Appendix B.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 4 together with (43), (44), (47) and (48) is
I(M b;Zb|H) ≤ (3b+ 2b2)ε, (49)
thereby completing the proof for Case A).
Case B): Proof for the achievability of RCSI-2:
The remainder of Theorem 1 to be proved is the acievability of RCSI-2(p(u), p(x|u, s)) in (5).
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The rate constraints in this case are listed as follows (R0 = 0):
R < I(U ;Y ), (50)
R = R1, (51)
R2 > H(S|UY ), (52)
R1 +R2 < R, (53)
R1 +R2 < H(S|UZ). (54)
These constraints are the same as those in Case A) with R0 = 0 and H(S|UZ) instead of H(S|Z), where constraint
(13) is not necessary here because of R0 = 0. The reason for the replacement of H(S|Z) by H(S|UZ) is that,
since R0 = 0, we cannot here leverage the randomization (over input Uj ) due to Wyner’s WC coding to keep the
Uj secure from the attack by Eve.
Fourier-Motzkin elimination claims that the supremum of R over all rates satisfying (50)∼ (54) coincides with
the RCSI-2(p(u), p(x|u, s)), so it suffices to show that rates R satisfying (50)∼ (54) are achievable.
In this case too, the proof argument parallels those as developed in the proof for Case A) with R0 = 0, where
we notice that I(M0j ;SjZj |H) = 0 in Lemma 4 and hence Lemma 6 is not needed here, thereby completing the
achievability proof for this case.
IV. SECRECY CAPACITY RESULTS
Thus far we have developed achievability arguments for WCs with CSI available only at the encoder (Alice) to
establish Theorem 1 on lower bounds to the secrecy capacity CCSI-E. In this section, in order to get more insights
into this theorem, we address the problem of bounding the secrecy capacities for the case of (statistically) degraded
WCs, which is an important class of WCs.
Let us first describe the first theorem in this section:
Theorem 2: For any degraded WC (Z is a degraded version of Y ) with causal CSI only at Alice, we have
CCSI-E ≥ max
p(x|s)
min
(
I(XS;Y )− I(XS;Z), I(XS;Y )−H(S)
)
(55)
CCSI-E ≤ max
p(x|s)
min
(
I(XS;Y )− I(XS;Z), I(XS;Y )− I(S;Y )
)
(56)
CKNCSI-E ≥ max
I(XS;Y )≥H(S)
(
I(XS;Y )− I(XS;Z)
)
(57)
CKNCSI-E ≤ max
p(x|s)
(
I(XS;Y )− I(XS;Z)
)
, (58)
where CKNCSI-E denotes the non-causal secret-key capacity (as for the definition, see, e.g., Khisti et al. [15],
Prabhakaran et al. [24], Bunin et al. [26]). In contrast with this, CCSI-E may be called the secret-message capacity.
The maximization in (57) is taken over all XS such that I(XS;Y ) ≥ H(S).
Remark 4: Lower bounds (55) and (57) hold without the assumption of degradedness. It is is easy to check that
I(XS;Y )− I(XS;Z) in (55) ∼ (58) is nonnegative for degraded WCs, while I(XS;Y )−H(S) in (55) may be
negative.
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Proof of (55) (Achievability):
Let (X,S) be arbitrarily given, then the functional representation lemma [29] claims that there exist a random
variable U and a deterministic function f : U × S → X such that U and S are independent and X = f(U, S).
Then, the first term of the achievable rate RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) given in Theorem 1 can be rewritten as follows.
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;SZ) +H(S|Z)−H(S|UY )
= I(U ;SY )− I(U ;S|Y )− I(U ;SZ) +H(S|Z)−H(S|UY )
= I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S) +H(S|Z)−H(S|Y )
(v)
= I(XU ;Y |S)− I(XU ;Z|S) +H(S|Z)−H(S|Y )
(w)
= I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S) +H(S|Z)−H(S|Y )
= I(XS;Y )− I(XS;Z), (59)
where (v) follows from that X is a deterministic function of (U, S); (w) follows from that U → SX → Y Z forms
a Markov chain.
On the other hand, the second term of RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) can be rewritten as follows.
I(U ;Y )−H(S|UY )
= I(U ;SY )− I(U ;S|Y )−H(S|UY )
= I(U ;Y |S)−H(S|Y )
(y)
= I(XU ;Y |S)−H(S|Y )
(z)
= I(X ;Y |S)−H(S|Y )
= I(XS;Y )−H(S), (60)
where in (y), (z) we have used the similar argument to (v), (w).
Therefore, in view of Theorem 1, combining (59) and (60) yields (55).
Proof of (56) (Converse):
Here, we invoke the following simple but powerful lemma:
Lemma 7 (Chen and Vinck [7]): Let us consider a degraded WC with CSI S such that Z is a degraded version
of Y . Then, the secrecy capacity with non-causal CSI only at the encoder (=E), denoted by CNCSI-E, is upper
bounded as
CNCSI-E ≤ max
p(u|s)p(x|u,s)
(I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)), (61)
where we notice that U and S may be correlated.
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We compute I(U ;Y ) and I(U ;Z) separately with arbitrary USX .
I(U ;Y )
= I(USX ;Y )− I(SX ;Y |U)
= I(S;Y ) + I(UX ;Y |S)− I(S;Y |U)− I(X ;Y |US)
= I(X ;Y |S) + I(S;Y )− I(S;Y |U)− I(X ;Y |US). (62)
Similarly,
I(U ;Z)
= I(X ;Z|S) + I(S;Z)− I(S;Z|U)− I(X ;Z|US). (63)
Hence,
I(U ;Y )− (U ;Z)
= I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S) + I(S;Y )− I(S;Z)
−
(
I(S;Y |U)− I(S;Z|U)
)
−
(
I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)
)
≤ I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S) + I(S;Y )− I(S;Z)
= I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S) +H(S|Z)−H(S|Y )
= I(XS;Y )− I(XS;Z), (64)
where in the above inequality we have used the propertry I(S;Y |U) − I(S;Z|U) ≥ 0 and I(X ;Y |US) −
I(X ;Z|US) ≥ 0, which comes from the assumed degradedness.
Another upper bound R ≤ I(SX ;Y )− I(S;Y ) is derived as follows. For any achievable rate R, Fano inequality
yields (with εn → 0 as n tends to ∞):
nR = H(M)
≤ H(M)−H(M |Y n) + nεn
= I(M ;Y n) + nεn
=
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Yi|Y
i−1) + nεn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(MY i−1;Yi) + nεn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(MY i−1;SiYi) + nεn
(p)
=
n∑
i=1
I(MY i−1;Yi|Si) + nεn
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≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiMY
i−1;Yi|Si) + nεn
(q)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|Si) + nεn
(r)
= nI(XJ ;YJ |SJJ) + nεn
≤ nI(JXJ ;YJ |SJ) + nεn
(s)
= nI(XJ ;YJ |SJ ) + nεn
(t)
= nI(X ;Y |S) + nεn, (65)
where (p) comes from the independence of Si andMY
i−1; (q) follows from the Markov chain propertyMY i−1 →
XiSi → Yi; in (r) J is the random variable such that Pr{J = i)} =
1
n
(i = 1, · · · , n); (s) follows from the Markov
chain property J → XJSJ → YJ ; in (t) we have set X = XJ , Y = YJ , S = SJ .
An immediate consequence (deviding by n and letting n→∞) of (65) is
R ≤ I(X ;Y |S)
= I(XS;Y )− I(S;Y ) (66)
with input† X . Thus, combining (64) and (66) together with Lemma 7 yields (56).
Secret-key capacity results:
We see that there is a gap between the second terms of (55) and (56), i.e., H(S) 6= I(S;Y ). These terms are
due to the physical channel capability limitation, which are indispensable when we are concerned with the secret-
message capacity like in the foregoing. On the other hand, however, as far as we are concerned with the secret-key
capacity, such terms are not necessarily involved.
Proof of (57) (Achievability):
We first invoke the following achievability theorem:
Theorem 3 (Khisti et al. [15]): For any WC, the (weak) secret-key capacity with non-causal CSI available only
at the encoder is lower bounded as
CKNCSI-E ≥ max
I(V ;Y )≥I(V ;S)
(I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)), (67)
where the maximization in (67) is taken over all V S such that I(V ;Y ) ≥ I(V ;S) and we notice that V and S
may be correlated.
Remark 5: In fact, the “causal” version of formula (67) in Theorem 3 is given by
CKCSI-E ≥ max
I(V ;Y )≥I(V ;S)
(I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)), (68)
†Actually, in order to conclude (56), we need to show that X in (64) and X (66) can be taken to be the same. However, this can be ascertained
by carefully scritinizing the proof of Lemma 7.
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where V = (U, S) (U and S are independent) and CKCSI-E denotes the (strong) secret-key capacity with causal CSI
available only at the encoder. Accordingly, CKNCSI-E in (57) and (58) can be replaced by C
K
CSI-E. The proof of (68)
will be given in a forthcoming paper [33] as a special case of more general causal WCs.
Now, let (X,S) be arbitrarily given and let U and f be those as specified by the functional representation lemma
[29] as in the proof of (55). We then compute the right-hand side of (67) with V = (U, S) as follows:
I(US;Y )− I(US;Z)
(b)
= I(USX ;Y )− I(USX ;Z)
(c)
= I(XS;Y )− I(XS;Z), (69)
where in (b) we noticed that X is a deterministic function of (U, S); (c) follows from that U → XS → Y Z forms
a Markov chain. On the other hand,
I(US;Y )− I(US;S)
= I(SU ;Y )−H(S)
(d)
= I(XSU ;Y )−H(S)
(e)
= I(XS;Y )−H(S), (70)
where (d) follows since X is a deterministic function of (U, S); (e) follows from the Markov chain property
U → XS → Y . Thus, Theorem 3 together with (69) and (70) yields (57).
Proof of (58) (Converse):
To show the converse part, we first observe that Lemma 7 is still valid with CKNCSI-E instead of CNCSI-E, which
can be ascertained by carefully scrutinizing the proof in [7] (with secret key K instead of secret message M ) of
Lemma 7. Then, in the entirely same way as above, we have (64), implying the converse here.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 2 is the following corollaries with degraded WCs, where, hereafter, we
denote by CCSI-ED, CNCS-ED, C
K
NCSI-ED the (strong) secrecy capacities of WCs with common CSI S available at both
the enceder (=E) and decoder (=D):
Corollary 1 (Strengthening of Chia and El Gamal [17]): It holds that
CCSI-ED = CNCSI-ED
= max
p(x|s)
min
(
I(XS;Y S)− I(XS;Z), I(XS;Y S)−H(S)
)
= max
p(x|s)
min
(
I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S) +H(S|Z), I(X ;Y |S)
)
(71)
Corollary 2: It holds that
CKCSI-ED = C
K
NCSI-ED
= max
p(x|s)
(
I(XS;Y S)− I(XS;Z)
)
= max
p(x|s)
(
I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S) +H(S|Z)
)
. (72)
July 30, 2019 DRAFT
20
Proof: It suffices to replace Y by SY in (55) ∼ (58), where we have taken account of Remark 5. .
Remark 6: In fact, Khisti et al. [15] has, instead of (72), given the following (weak) formula (not assuming the
degradedness) as:
CKNCSI-ED = max
p(u,x|s)
(
I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S) +H(S|Z)
)
. (73)
However, the proof in [15] for the converse part seems to contain a serious technical flaw.
Next, following Chia and El Gamal [17], let us consider the following special WC to have
Corollary 3: Let us consider a degraded WC such that Z is a degraded version of Y and p(y, z|x, s) = p(y, z|x),
then we have
CCSI-E = CNCSI-E = max
p(x)
(I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)). (74)
Remark 7: This result coincides with an intuition that this WC may reduce simply to a WC without CSI at Alice
and Bob, because CSI S at Alice has no correlation to Bob. In this connection, it will be useful to compare this
result with that in [17] with common CSI S available at both the encoder and decoder, the secrecy capacity of
which is given as
CCSI-ED = CNCSI-ED = max
p(x)
min[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z) +H(S), I(X ;Y )]. (75)
Clearly, in (75) the state information S contributes to making achievable rates higher by H(S), whereas in (74)
the CSI makes no contribution. This shows that “two-sided” CSI (available both at Alice and Bob) indeed can
outperform “one-sided” CSI (available only at Alice).
Proof of Corollary 3: We first observe that
RCSI-0(p(u), p(x|u, s)) = I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
= I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z) (76)
by setting X = U with S independent of X , which implies the achievability.
In order to show the converse part, we compute as follows:
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
= I(UX ;Y )− I(X ;Y |U)
−I(UX ;Z) + I(X ;Z|U)
= I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)
−I(X ;Y |U) + I(X ;Z|U). (77)
On the other hand, owing to the assumed degradedness, we have
I(X ;Y |U)
= I(X ;ZY |U)
= I(X ;Z|U) + I(X ;Y |UZ). (78)
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From (77) and (78), it follows that
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) ≤ I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z). (79)
Thus, in light of Lemma 7 together with (76) and (79), the corollary is concluded.
So far, we have studied WCs with non-binary alphabets. It would also be interesting to see what happens with
binary WCs (U = X = Y = Z = S = {0, 1}). Letting ⊕ denote the exclusive OR, we consider the binary WC
defined by
Y = X ⊕ S ⊕Ψ, (80)
Z = X ⊕ S ⊕ Φ, (81)
where X,S,Φ,Ψ are mutually independent. and Φ,Ψ play the role of external ”additive” noises independent from
the CSI S. We assume here that H(Φ) > H(Ψ) and hence Z is a degraded version of Y in (80) and (81).
Theorem 4: For the thus defined binary degraded WC, we have
CCSI-E = CNCSI-E = H(Φ)−H(Ψ). (82)
Remark 8: For comparison, let us consider the case where the encoder is not provided the CSI S. In this case,
it is natural to regard S as an additive noise to the channel, then we have the secrecy capacity CM without CSI:
CM = H(S ⊕ Φ)−H(S ⊕Ψ). (83)
It is obvious that
H(Φ)−H(Ψ) > H(S ⊕ Φ)−H(S ⊕Ψ), (84)
which implies that the existence of CSI S can indeed outperform the channel without CSI. Formula (82) means
that the secrecy capacity for this WC does not depend on S, which is a consequence of elimination of “noise” S
by making use of the CSI and is in nice accordance with the formula of Costa [32] on writing on (Gaussian) dirty
paper. A Gaussian counterpart is discussed also in Khisti et al. [15].
Proof of Theorem 4:
Set X = U ⊕ S where U and X,S,Φ,Ψ are independent, then
Y = U ⊕ Ψ, (85)
Z = U ⊕ Φ. (86)
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To show the achievability part, it suffices only to consider
RCSI-0(p(u), p(x|u, s))
= I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
= H(U)−H(U |Y )− (H(U)−H(U |Z))
= H(U |Z)−H(U |Y )
= H(U |U ⊕ Φ)−H(U |U ⊕Ψ)
= H(Φ|U ⊕ Φ)−H(Ψ|U ⊕Ψ)
= H(Φ)−H(Ψ), (87)
where the last step follows by setting U ∼(1/2, 1/2), which implies the achievability.
On the other hand, in order to show the converse part, we invoke (61) of Lemma 7. Let us evaluate the right-hand
side of (61) as follows:
I(U ;Y )
= I(U ;X ⊕ S ⊕Ψ)
(a)
= I(U ⊕ S;X ⊕Ψ)
= I(X,U ⊕ S;X ⊕Ψ)
−I(X ;X ⊕Ψ|U ⊕ S)
= I(X ;X ⊕Ψ)
−I(X ;X ⊕Ψ|U ⊕ S), (88)
where in (a) we noticed that (U,X⊕S⊕Ψ) and (U ⊕S,X⊕Ψ) are in one-to-one correspondence under operation
⊕S.
Similarly, we have
I(U ;Z)
= I(X ;X ⊕ Φ)
−I(X ;X ⊕ Φ|U ⊕ S). (89)
Hence,
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
= I(X ;X ⊕Ψ) − I(X ;X ⊕ Φ)
−(I(X ;X ⊕Ψ|U ⊕ S)− I(X ;X ⊕ Φ|U ⊕ S)). (90)
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We now notice that X ⊕ Φ is a degraded version of X ⊕Ψ to obtain
I(X ;X ⊕Ψ|U ⊕ S) ≥ I(X ;X ⊕ Φ)|U ⊕ S), (91)
from which together with (90) it follows that
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) ≤ I(X ;X ⊕Ψ) − I(X ;X ⊕ Φ). (92)
It is easy also to see that
max
p(x)
(I(X ;X ⊕Ψ) − I(X ;X ⊕ Φ)) = H(Φ)−H(Ψ), (93)
where max can be attained with X ∼ (1/2.1/2), which implies the converse.
In passing this section, let us look back at Theorem 2 to scrutinize more the significance. We first notice that the
achievability of RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) in Theorem 1 (and hence the achievability (55) in Theorem 2) is based on
one-time pad cipher that is attained by reproducing CSI Sn at Alice as Sˆn at Bob. Furthermore, the achievability
in Theorem 3 with V = (U, S) (and hence the achievability (57) in Theorem 2) is also based on the reproduction
of CSI Sn at Alice as Sˆn at Bob as well.
In view of these observations along with Remark 5, we are now interested in what happens if we confine ourselves
to within those coding schemes that the CSI Sn at Alice is required to be reproduced as Sˆn at Bob (this kind of
coding schemes are said to be state-reproducing). To see this, let the corresponding secret-message capacity and
secret-key capacity be denoted by the overlined quantities as C, then we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5: For any degraded WC (Z is a degraded version of Y ) with causal CSI only at Alice, we have
CCSI-E = CNCSI-E
= max
p(x|s)
min
(
I(XS;Y )− I(XS;Z), I(XS;Y )−H(S)
)
, (94)
C
K
CSI-E = C
K
NCSI-E
= max
I(XS;Y )≥H(S)
(
I(XS;Y )− I(XS;Z)
)
. (95)
Remark 9: It is easy to check that the right-hand side of (94) is not greater than the right-hand side of (95).
Proof of (94):
It suffices to prove only the converse. Since message M and CSI Sn are independent and Sn is reproducible at
Bob, Fano inequality with achievable rates R and εn → 0 claims that
nR = H(M)
≤ H(M)−H(MSn|Y n) + nεn
≤ H(MSn)−H(Sn)−H(MSn|Y n) + nεn
≤ I(MSn;Y n)− nH(S) + nεn
=
n∑
i=1
I(MSn;Yi|Y
i−1)− nH(S) + nεn
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≤
n∑
i=1
I(MSnY i−1;Yi)− nH(S) + nεn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiMS
nY i−1;Yi)− nH(S) + nεn
=
n∑
i=1
I(XiSiMS
i−1Sni+1Y
i−1;Yi)− nH(S) + nεn
(u)
=
n∑
i=1
I(XiSi;Yi)− nH(S) + nεn
=
n∑
i=1
(I(XiSi;Yi)−H(Si)) + nεn
(y)
= n(I(XS;Y )−H(S)) + nεn, (96)
where (u) follows from the Markov chain property MSi−1Sni+1Y
i−1 → XiSi → Yi; in (y) we have used the
argument similar to that in (65). Thus, R ≤ I(XS;Y )−H(S), which together with the proof of (56) implies the
converse here.
Proof of (95):
It suffices to prove only the converse. Since Sn is reproducible at Bob, similarly to the derivation in (96) we
have
nH(S) ≤ H(Sn)−H(Sn|Y n) + εn
= I(Sn;Y n) + εn
=
n∑
i=1
I(Sn;Yi|Y
i−1) + εn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(SnY i−1;Yi) + εn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiSiS
i−1Sni+1Y
i−1;Yi) + nεn
=
n∑
i=1
I(XiSi;Yi) + nεn
= nI(XS;Y ) + nεn. (97)
Thus, H(S) ≤ I(XS;Y ), which together with the proof of (58) implies the converse here.
V. COMPARISON WITH THE PREVIOUS RESULT
We have so far studied the problem of how to convey confidential message over WCs with causal CSI available
only at Alice under the information leakage IE = I(M
b;Zb) → 0. In this connection, we notice that this kind
of problem with causal CSI has not yet been brought to enough attention of the researcher, although the problem
for WCs with non-causal CSI has extensively been investigated in the literature. On the other hand, to the best of
our knowledge, Fujita [20] is supposed to be the first who has significantly addressed the problem of WCs with
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causal CSI available only at Alice (used for key agreement with Bob), although its non-causal counterpart had
been studied by Khisti, Diggavi and Wornell [15]. In this section, we develop the comparison with our results.
In order to describe the main result of [20] in our terminology, define
FCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) = min
[
I(U ;SY )− I(U ;SZ)
+H(S|Z)−H(S|Y ),
I(U ;SY )−H(S|Y )
]
, (98)
and let CwCSI-E denote the secrecy capacity under the weak secrecy criterion
1
n
I(M b;Zb) → 0 instead of CCSI-E.
Then,
Theorem 6 (Fujita [20, Lemma 1]): Let us consider a degraded WC where Z is a physically degraded version
of Y , then
CwCSI-E ≥ max
p(u),p(x|u,s)
FCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) (99)
holds.
For comparison, we rewrite FCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) in (98) as follows.
FCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) = min
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;SZ)
+H(S|Z)−H(S|UY ),
I(U ;Y )−H(S|UY )
]
, (100)
which is justified because
I(U ;SY ) = I(U ;Y ) + I(U ;S|Y ), (101)
H(S|Y ) = H(S|UY ) + I(U ;S|Y ). (102)
Recalling that the lower bound RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) in Theorem 1 is
RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) = min
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;SZ)
+H(S|Z)−H(S|UY ),
I(U ;Y )−H(S|UY )
]
(103)
and comparing it with (100), it turns out that RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) exactly coincides with FCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)).
Hence, the two largest lower bounds in Theorems 1 and 6 coincide with one another:
max
p(u),p(x|u,s)
RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)) = max
p(u),p(x|u,s)
FCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)). (104)
On the other hand, the other largest lower bound in Theorem 1:
max
p(u),p(x|u,s)
RCSI-2(p(u), p(x|u, s)) (105)
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can be shown to be strictly larger than the left-hand side of (104) for an approximately selected WC in which Y
is a degraded version of Z (e.g., see [17, Example 2]), that is
max
p(u),p(x|u,s)
RCSI-2(p(u), p(x|u, s)) > max
p(u),p(x|u,s)
RCSI-1(p(u), p(x|u, s)), (106)
which together with (104) implies that for this WC the lower bound in Theorem 1 is strictly larger than the lower
bound in Theorem 6.
Now, we are in a position to point out further crucial differences between [20] and this paper, which is due to
the completely different approaches taken to the problem. These are summarized as follows.
• [20] heavily depends on the assumption that the WC treated needs to be physically degraded, whereas this
paper makes no such assumption.
• [20] confines itself to within the weak secrecy criterion problem ( 1
n
I(M ;Z)→ 0), whereas this paper employs
the strong secrecy criterion approach (I(M ;Z)→ 0). As a consequence, all the results in [20] (and [17]) are
guaranteed to hold as they are under the strong secrecy criterion too.
• In [20] all alphabets such as U ,S,X ,Y,Z are required to be finite, whereas in this paper U ,X ,Y,Z except
for S may be arbitrary (including continuous alphabet cases), so that Theorem 1 as stated in Section II is
directly applicable also to, e.g., Gaussian WCs with causal CSI available at Alice.
• The fundamental mathematical tool in [20] to deal with the problem is the typical sequence argument (of
course, well established), whereas in this paper the fundamental ingredients consist of Slepian-Wolf coding,
Csisza´r-Ko¨rner’s key construction, Gallager’s maximum likelihood decoding, and Han-Verdu´’s resolvability
argument (of course, well established). This methodological difference brings about a new look from the
viewpoint of information theoretic perspective and applicability. One of the consequences is that the way of
proving the main theorem here is significantly different from that in [20]. This, for example, enabled us to
naturally establish the strong secrecy property, which, as is well known, would not be quite easy to be attained
by the usual typical sequence arguments.
• Most importantly, we see that there exists a crucial difference between [20] and this paper from the coding
theoretic standpoint. Seemingly, both invoke the block Markov coding scheme as devised in [16], which is
furnished with a kind of forward-backward coding procedure.
However, in [20], the “recursive” forward-backward coding procedure is employed in the sense that the j-th
encoding in each block j is carried out (which is carried over to the next block j + 1) according to the order
j = 1, 2, · · · , b. During this procedure over the total b blocks no decoding is carried out. When the encoding
reaches the final block j = b the decoding procedure gets started, which is carried back to block j = b − 1.
This decoding procedure is repeated backward according to the order j = b, b − 1, · · · , 1, which causes at
worst “2b block decoding delay” in the whole process.
On the other hand, this paper employs the “iterative” forward-backward coding procedure in the sense that
not only the j-th encoding in each block j (which is carried over to the next block j+1) but also the decoding
for the previous block j−1 are carried out according to the order j = 1, 2, · · · , b. This one-way coding scheme
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causes only “one block decoding delay.”
Why is this difference? The reason for this is that in [20] the decoding operation in block j is to be made
upon receiving the information SjYj but the decoding operation for Sj is postponed to the next block j + 1
and it is in turn postponed to block j+2, and recursively so on to reach the final block j = b. Thus, actually,
Sj is decoded according to the order j = b, b − 1, · · · , 1. In contrast with this, in this paper the decoding
operation in block j is made upon receiving the information Yj , based on which Uj is decoded and used
to decode Sj−1 in block j − 1, and then proceed to the next block j + 1. This means that only one block
decoding delay and hence low complexities are needed.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this last section, let us get started with quoting a paragraph from Chia and El Gamal [17], which addressed
an interesting non-trivial problem:
We used key generation from state information to improve the message transmission rate. It may be possible
to extend this idea to the case when the state information is available only at the encoder. This case, however,
is not straightforward to analyze since it would be necessary for the encoder to reveal some state information to
the decoder (and, hence, partially to the eavesdropper) in order to agree on a secret key, which would reduce the
wiretap coding part of the rate.
Motivated by it, we have investigated the coding problem for WCs with causal CSI at Alice and/or Bob, and
established reasonable lower bounds on the secrecy capacity, which are summarized as Theorems 1 (one of the
key results in this paper). Although Theorem 1 treats the WC with CSI available only at Alice, it can actually be
useful enough for investigating general WCs with three correlated causal CSIs available at Alice, Bob and Eve,
respectively. We would like to remind that this seemingly general WCs can actually be reduced to our WCs with
CSI available only at Alice. In this connection, the reader may refer, for example, to Khisti, Diggavi and Wornell
[15], and Goldfeld, Cuff and Permuter [25].
As was pointed out in Section V, the main ingredients thereby to establish Theorems 1 actually consist of
the well established information-theoretic lemmas such as Slepian-Wolf coding, Csisza´r-Ko¨rner’s key construction,
Gallagers maximum likelihood decoding, and Han-Verdu´’s resolvability argument, while not invoking the celebrated
argument of typical sequences, which enabled us to well handle also the case with alphabets not necessarily finite,
for example, including possibly the case of Gaussian WCs with CSI. Actually, this approach enabled us to derive
some interesting results for degraded WCs as follows. Theorem 2 gives lower and upper bounds for the secret (-
message) capacity, while, fortunately, the exact formula for the secret-key capacity has been determined. Corollary
3 shows a causal secrecy capacity with one-sided CSI, which has nice correspondence with the interesting result
of Chia and El Gamal with two-sided CSI [17], while Theorem 4 gives the secrecy capacity for binary WCs with
one-sided CSI to establish a counterpart of Gaussian WCs studied by Costa [32] as Writing on dirty paper. Thus,
these results together would provide a basic basis for further investigation of WCs with causal CSI.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Proof of i): We can rewrite the security index S(κ(Sj)σ(Sj)|Zj) in (18) of Lemma 2 as
S(κ(Sj)σ(Sj)|Zj)
= S(KjNj+1|Zj)
= D(PKjNj+1 ||QKjNj+1) + I(KjNj+1;Zj)
≥ I(KjNj+1;Zj), (107)
which together with Lemma 2 gives i).
Proof of ii): Here we use the following recurrence relation:
I(Kj−1Nj ;Z
j−1|H)
= I(Kj−1Nj;Zj−1|H)
+I(Kj−1Nj ;Z
j−2|Zj−1H)
≤ I(Kj−1Nj;Zj−1|H)
+I(Kj−2Nj−1Kj−1Nj ;Z
j−2|Zj−1H)
(j)
= I(Kj−1Nj;Zj−1|H)
+I(Kj−2Nj−1;Z
j−2|Zj−1H)
(k)
≤ I(Kj−1Nj;Zj−1|H)
+I(Kj−2Nj−1;Z
j−2|H), (108)
where (j) follows from the Markov chain property Zj−2 → Kj−2Nj−1 → Kj−1Nj given Zj−1H; (k) follows
from the Markov chain property Zj−2 → Kj−2Nj−1 → Zj−1 given H. Then, taking the summation of both sides
in (108) over j ∈ [1 : l] (1 ≤ l ≤ b) we have
I(Kl−1Nl;Z
l−1|H) ≤
l∑
j=1
I(Kj−1Nj ;Zj−1|H)
≤
b∑
j=1
I(Kj−1Nj ;Zj−1|H)
(m)
= bε, (109)
where we have noticed that I(Kj−2Nj−1;Z
j−2|H) = 0 for j = 1 and (m) follows from i) of Lemma 5, thereby
completing the proof.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
The proof is carried out basically along the line of Han and Verdu´ [31, (8.3)] and Hayashi [21, Theorem 3]). We
evaluate here the resolvability in terms of I(M0j ;SjZj |H) under rate constraint
R−R0 > I(U ;SZ), (110)
which is developed as follows.
For each m0 ∈ [1 : 2
nR0 ], let U(m0) denote the random variable uj(L(m0)) where L(m0) is distributed
uniformly on the bin B(m0) with rate constraint (110), and define the channel
W (t|u)
∆
= PT(m0)|U(m0),
where T(m0)
∆
= (S(m0),Z(m0)), t
∆
= (s, z) and we notice that PS(m0)Z(m0)|U(m0) does not depend on m0, so
that we can write PUSZ instead of PU(m0)S(m0)Z(m0). Now, set
Ln = 2
n(R−R0) (111)
and
iUW (u, t) = log
W (t|u)
PT(t)
. (112)
Then,
I(M0j ;SjZj |H) =
1
2nR0
2nR0∑
m0=1
EHD(PT(m0)|U(m0)||PT(m0))
(a)
= EHD(PT|U||PT)
=
∑
t∈Sn×Zn
∑
c1∈Un
· · ·
∑
cLn∈U
n
PU(c1) · · ·PU(cLn)
·
1
Ln
Ln∑
j=1
W (t|cj) log
(
1
Ln
Ln∑
k=1
exp iUW (ck, t)
)
=
∑
c1∈Un
· · ·
∑
cLn∈U
n
PU(c1) · · ·PU(cLn)
·
∑
t∈Sn×Zn
W (t|c1) log
(
1
Ln
Ln∑
k=1
exp iUW (ck, t)
)
(b)
≤
∑
c1∈Un
∑
t∈Sn×Zn
W (t|c1)PU(c1)
· log
(
1
Ln
exp iUW (c1, t)+
1
Ln
Ln∑
k=2
E exp iUW (Ck, t)
)
(c)
≤ E
[
log
(
1 +
1
Ln
exp iUW (U,T)
)]
, (113)
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where (a) follows from the symmetry of the random code H; (b) follows from the concavity of the logarithm; (c)
is the result of
E[exp iUW (Ck, t)] = 1
for all t ∈ Sn × Zn and k = 1, 2, · · · , Ln. Now, with Q(u) = PU(u), apply a simple inequality with 0 < ρ < 1
and x ≥ 0:
log(1 + x) =
log(1 + x)ρ
ρ
≤
log(1 + xρ)
ρ
≤
xρ
ρ
to (113) to eventaully obtain
I(M0j ;SjZj |H) ≤
1
ρLρn
E
(
W (T|U)
PT(T)
)ρ
=
1
ρLρn
∑
t∈Sn×Zn
∑
u∈Un
Q(u)W (t|u)
(
W (t|u)
PT(t)
)ρ
=
1
ρLρn
∑
t∈Sn×Zn
∑
u∈Un
Q(u)W (t|u)1+ρPT(t)
−ρ. (114)
On the other hand, by virtue of Ho¨lder’s inequality,( ∑
u∈Un
Q(u)W (t|u)1+ρ
)
PT(t)
−ρ
=
( ∑
u∈Un
Q(u)W (t|u)1+ρ
)( ∑
u∈Un
Q(u)W (t|u)
)−ρ
≤
( ∑
u∈Un
Q(u)W (t|u)
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ
(115)
for 0 < ρ < 1. Therefore, it follows from (111) that
I(M0j ;SjZj |H) ≤
1
ρLρn
∑
t∈Sn×Zn
( ∑
u∈Un
Q(u)W (t|u)
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ
=
1
ρ
exp
[
−[nρ(R−R0) + E0(ρ,Q)]
]
, (116)
where
E0(ρ,Q) = − log

 ∑
t∈Sn×Zn
( ∑
u∈Un
Q(u)W (t|u)
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ . (117)
Then, by means of Gallager [28, Theorem 5.6.3], we have E0(ρ,Q)|ρ=0 = 0 and
∂E0(ρ,Q)
∂ρ
∣∣∣∣
ρ=0
= −I(Q,W )
= −I(U;SZ)
(d)
= −nIU ;SZ),
(118)
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where (d) follows because (U,SZ) is a correlated i.i.d. sequence with generic variable (U, SZ). Thus, for any
small constant τ > 0 there exists a ρ0 > 0 such that, for all 0 < ρ ≤ ρ0,
E0(ρ,Q) ≥ −nρ(1 + τ)I(U ;SZ) (119)
which is substituted into (116) to obtain
I(M0j ;SjZj |H)
≤
1
ρ
exp
[
−nρ(R−R0 − (1 + τ)I(U ;SZ))
]
. (120)
On the other hand, in view of (110), with some δ > 0 we can write
R−R0 = I(U ;SZ) + 2δ, (121)
which leads to
R−R0 − (1 + τ)I(U ;SZ)
= I(U ;SZ) + 2δ − I(U ;SZ)− τI(U ;SZ)
= 2δ − τI(U ;SZ)). (122)
We notice here that τ > 0 can be arbitrarily small, so that the last term on the right-hand side of (122) can be
made larger than δ > 0. Then, (120) yields
I(M0j ;SjZj |H) ≤
1
ρ
exp[−nρδ], (123)
which implies that, for any small ε > 0,
I(M0j ;SjZj |H) ≤ ε (124)
for all sufficiently large n, completing the proof of Lemma 6.
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